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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Shawn Thomas Wheeler appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony driving under the influence 
claiming (1) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by allegedly presenting false 
testimony, and (2) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
results of his blood alcohol concentration test. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedinqs 
Trooper Jeff Jayne received a report that an individual, later identified as 
Wheeler, was driving drunk along Highway 200 near the rock quarry. (Trial Tr., 
Vol. I, p.49, L.2 - p.50, L.l; Ex. E, p.2.) When Trooper Jayne drove past the 
quarry, he saw Wheeler on the ground in the quarry, lying near his motorcycle. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.52, Ls.1-16; Ex. E, p.2.) Wheeler sat up and looked around as 
Trooper Jayne drove by. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.52, Ls.12-16.) At that point, Trooper 
Jayne and Lieutenant Jim Drake decided to park off the side of the highway near 
the quarry and wait to see if Wheeler would drive back out on the highway. (Trial 
Tr., Vol. I, p.56, Ls.12-25.) 
As Trooper Jayne and Lieutenant Drake were standing outside of their 
patrol vehicles talking, they heard a motorcycle "starting and revving," at which 
point Trooper Jayne "stepped out real quick out to the highway on foot to try to 
look down the highway to see if [he] could see anything" and saw Wheeler 
"finishing his turn out of the rock pit and start heading west on his motorcycle." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.58, L.21 - p.59, L.7; Ex. E, p.2.) Trooper Jayne and 
1 
Lieutenant Drake then got back in their cars and pursued Wheeler down the 
highway, eventually stopping him. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.59, L.24 - p.60, L.7, p.61, 
L.21 -p.67, L.12; EX. E, p.2.) 
After Trooper Jayne detained Wheeler he attempted to perform field 
sobriety tests, but Wheeler was not cooperative. (Ex. E, p.2; Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.8, 
L . l l  -p.9, L.2.) Trooper Jayne asked Wheeler to submit to a breath test but 
Wheeler initially did not respond. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.71, L.24 - p.72, L.8.) 
Although Wheeler eventually said "yeah" after Trooper Jayne asked him several 
times whether he would take a breath test, Wheeler then immediately started 
asking Trooper Jayne about the location of the "bulldozers." (Ex. 1,' 18:31:35- 
58.) Trooper Jayne interpreted Wheeler's unresponsive behavior and his 
"changing the subject and talking about other things" as a refusal to submit to 
breath testing and requested assistance for a blood draw. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.72, 
Ls.3-6; Ex. 1, 18:51:20-29.) Trooper Jayne also later indicated a preference for 
a blood draw versus a breath test. (Ex. 1, 1851 :25-29.) 
Trooper Jayne had Lieutenant Drake request the assistance of the 
"ambulance crew" to withdraw Wheeler's blood for testing.2 (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.72, 
Ls. 18-21 ; Ex. 1, 18:33:50-18:34:10.) The "ambulance crew" responded and one 
of the crew members who indicated he was qualified to draw Wheeler's blood did 
so while Wheeler was in the back of Trooper Jayne's patrol car. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
' Exhibit 1 is a recording of the traffic stop from Trooper Jayne's patrol car. (Trial 
Tr., Vol. I ,  p.60, Ls.8-16.) 
The ambulance crew had been on scene earlier after the initial call regarding 
Wheeler's physical condition due to concerns that he might need medical 
assistance. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.198, L.3 - p.200, L.1.) 
p.72, L.18 - p.73, L.12; Ex. I, 18:53:50 -19:03:33.) The results of the blood test 
revealed Wheeler's blood alcohol concentration was .33. (Ex. 4.) 
The state charged Wheeler with felony driving under the influence and 
driving without privileges. (R., pp.8-12, 17-18.) Prior to trial, Wheeler filed a 
motion to suppress contending he was "subjected to unreasonable force, during 
and after a blood draw initiated by the arresting officer." (R., p.41.) The court 
conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. (See ~enerally 7/25/07 
Tr.; R., p.48.) 
A jury convicted Wheeler (R., p.110) and the court imposed a unified ten- 
year sentence with four years fixed and retained jurisdiction (R., pp.117-119, 
126-130). Wheeler filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.115-16.) 
ISSUES 
Wheeler states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct by 
continuing to allow the police officer to submit false 
testimony and then vouching for the trooper's credibility 
during closing arguments? 
2. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Wheeler's motion to 
suppress the results of the forcible blood draw because it 
was unreasonable under the circumstances and Mr. Wheeler 
revoked his implied consent? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1 Has Wheeler failed to establish any basis for concluding the prosecutor 
engaged in misconduct by "allow[ingl" Trooper Jayne to present false testimony? 
2. Has Wheeler failed to establish the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
Wheeler Has Failed To Establish Any Basis For Concludina The Prosecutor 
Enaaned In Misconduct Bv "Allow[inal" Trooper Jayne To Present False 
Testimony 
A. Introduction 
Wheeler claims the "prosecutor committed misconduct when he allowed 
Trooper Jayne to testify falsely without correction." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) 
More specifically, Wheeler asserts Trooper Jayne falsely testified (1) at the 
preliminary hearing regarding his efforts to obtain a breath test from Wheeler and 
that Wheeler's "driving 'should show pretty good on [the] video,"' and (2) at the 
suppression hearing and at trial regarding the sequence of events in relation to 
reading Wheeler the advisory form and requesting a breath sample and giving 
Wheeler the option between a breath test and a blood test. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.17-22.) A review of the record and the applicable law reveals Wheeler has 
failed to establish any due process violation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate courts employ a bifurcated standard of reviewing due process 
claims on appeal, deferring to the trial court's factual findings but freely reviewing 
the application of the law to the facts found. State v. Schevers, 132 ldaho 786, 
788, 979 P.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Gray, 129 ldaho 784, 796, 932 
P.2d 907, 919 (Ct. App. 1997). 
C. Wheeler Has Failed To Establish The Prosecutor Enqaaed In Misconduct 
In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), the Supreme Court 
reiterated the well-established principle that the state cannot obtain a conviction 
through the knowing presentation of false evidence, including false testimony. 
"The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, 
allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." &a t  269 (citations omitted). "To 
prevail on a Napue claim, (Wheeler] must show that '(1) the testimony (or 
evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that 
the testimony was actually false, and (3) . . . the false testimony was material."' 
Hovev v. Avers, 458 F.3d 892, 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Haves v. Brown, 399 
F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Materiality is based upon whether there 
is "any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury." Sivak v. State, 134 ldaho 641, 649, 8 P.3d 636, 644 
(2000) (quoting UnitedStates 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)). "'[The fact 
that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it 
would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" & 
As an initial matter, the state submits Wheeler has failed to preserve his 
due process claims for appeal. "[The longstanding rule in ldaho is that a'ppellate 
courts will not consider issues, including constitutional issues, that are presented 
for the first time on appeal." State v. Cobler, --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 260618 * 5 
(citing State, 128 ldaho 50, 54-55, 910 P.2d 164, 168-69 (Ct.App.1994)). 
The only exception to this rule is if the error is fundamental. Id_ However, even 
if a claim could be considered as fundamental error, such a claim still cannot be 
considered if there is an inadequate record. Id. Because Wheeler did not raise 
any Napue claim before the district court, there are no factual findings by the 
district court nor is there any evidentiary development of Wheeler's constitutional 
claims. This Court should, therefore, decline to consider Wheeler's Napue 
claims. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 648 S.E.2d 288, 293-94 (N.C.App. 2007); 
State v. Sinaleton, 923 So.2d 803, 810 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2006). 
Even if this Court considers Wheeler's Napue claims for the first time on 
appeal, application of the foregoing standards to each of Wheeler's claims 
reveals he has failed establish any Napue violation. Wheeler asserts Trooper 
Jayne testified falsely at the preliminary hearing by (1) "stat[ing] that he tried to 
hold up the Alco-Sensor II" but "Wheeler would turn away and look away," and 
(2) "claim[ing] that Mr. Wheeler's driving 'should show pretty good on my video."' 
(Appellant's Brief, p.20.) In support of his claim that this testimony was false, 
Wheeler cites "Exhibit, ISP Video" which he asserts reveals (1) Trooper Jayne's 
claim that he attempted to use the Alco-Sensor Ill is "completely false" because 
the video shows no such attempt, and (2) "[tlhe only driving that is visible on the 
video is Mr. Wheeler being on Mr. Overman's property." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) 
With respect to Wheeler's first argument that Trooper Jayne's testimony at 
the preliminary hearing that he attempted to use the Alco-Sensor was false, the 
state acknowledges the video does not reveal any such attempt. (a Ex. I ,  
18:25:25-18:31 :DO.) Even assuming the video contradicts the Trooper's 
testimony, this does not establish a Napue violation. Trooper Jayne testified he 
had not reviewed the video prior to the preliminary hearing and was, therefore, 
apparently testifying solely based on his recollection of the in~ident.~ (Prelim. Tr., 
p.14, Ls.1-4.) Further, there is no evidence that the prosecutor reviewed the 
video prior to the hearing. Although the prosecutor theoretically could have 
known Trooper Jayne's testimony on this point was inconsistent with the video, 
there was no "reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected 
the judgment of the jury," E, supra, nor was it material to whether there was 
probable cause to bind Wheeler over for felony driving under the influence. 
Wheeler's claim that the prosecutor knowingly permitted Trooper Jayne to 
falsely testify that "Wheeler's driving 'should show pretty good on [his] video"' 
also fails. Trooper Jayne's belief that the video would provide better footage of 
Wheeler's driving than it actually did does not make his testimony false. 
Accordingly, the prosecutor had no duty to "correct" Trooper Jayne's testimony. 
Furthermore, even if Trooper Jayne's testimony could be characterized as "false" 
there was no "reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected 
the judgment of the jury," E, supra, nor was it material to whether there was 
probable cause. 
Wheeler next argues that Trooper Jayne lied at the suppression hearing 
and at trial regarding when he asked Wheeler to submit to a breath test in 
relation to reading the advisory and whether or not he gave Wheeler a choice 
between a breath test and a blood test. (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-22.) With 
it is possible Trooper Jayne confused this particular encounter with Wheeler 
with prior encounters. (a Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.9, L.22 - p.1 I ,  L.5 (detailing prior 
encounter with Wheeler where Wheeler was intoxicated and also 
uncooperative).) 
respect to the sequence of events relative to the advisory form, Wheeler refers to 
the following testimony from the suppression hearing: 
Q: What was the next phase of the investigation that you 
intended to implement? 
A: I read Mr. Wheeler the Idaho 18-8002 advisory form advising 
him of the requirements to provide evidentiary testing and the 
results or the consequences if he did not. Then asked him to 
provide a breath sample, he would not do that. 
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.11, Ls.10-16.) 
Wheeler claims this testimony was false because "Trooper Jayne never 
offered Mr. Wheeler the opportunity to give a breath sample after reading his 
advisory rights." (Appellant's Brief, p.21 (emphasis added).) While it is true that 
Trooper Jayne's request for a breath test was made prior to rather than after the 
reading of the advisory form, Trooper Jayne did in fact read the advisory form 
and did in fact ask Wheeler if he would submit to a breath test. That the request 
preceded the reading of the advisory rather than followed it is surely not the type 
of falsehood with which the Constitution or the Supreme Court in NaDue was 
concerned. See, e.a., Davies v. Warden Louisiana State Penitentiaw, 2008 WL 
2680403 *5 (W.D.La. 2008). Even if it were, Wheeler's claim of error fails 
because the testimony regarding the timing of the request for a breath test in 
relation to when Trooper Jayne read the advisory was not material to the 
suppression issue which challenged only the reasonableness of the blood draw. 
With respect to Trooper Jayne's testimony at trial on this same issue, the 
testimony was not presented by the state. Rather, it was only introduced when 
defense counsel had Trooper Jayne read and explain the portion of his testimony 
from the suppression hearing relating to the advisory form. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.22.) As such, Wheeler cannot legitimately claim that the state knowingly 
introduced false evidence at trial. This is especially true given the fact it was the 
state that introduced the video upon which Wheeler relies to support his claim 
that Trooper Jayne's testimony was false. To the extent there were 
inconsistencies between Trooper Jayne's testimony at any given time and what 
appeared in the video, that evidence was presented to the jury by the state. The 
state had no further obligation to also highlight any inconsistencies on behalf of 
Wheeler. Wheeler has failed to establish the prosecutor engaged in misconduct 
in relation to this or any other alleged Napue violation. 
Wheeler also asserts the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by not only 
not correcting Trooper Jayne's allegedly false testimony but by "vouching" for his 
credibility during closing argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.17, 22-25.) To the 
extent Wheeler's assertion is, as it appears, part and parcel of his Napue claim, 
he has failed to establish error for the reasons set forth above. To the extent 
Wheeler is attempting to raise a separate misconduct claim based solely upon 
the prosecutor's closing argument, such a claim also fails. 
Wheeler did not object to the portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing of 
which he complains. (& Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.401, L.25 - p.402, L.8.) As such, 
his claim of error will not be considered absent a showing that the error was 
fundamental. State v. Severson, --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 1492659 * I 7  (Idaho 
2009). "Misconduct will be regarded as fundamental error when it 'goes to the 
foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or . . . to the foundation of the case or 
take[s] from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which 
no court could or ought to permit him to waive." Id. (quoting State v. Binaham, 
116 ldaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989)). Even then, "the conviction will 
not be reversed if the error is harmless." Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 *I7 (citing 
State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007)). In the context of 
closing arguments, the ldaho Supreme Court has stated: 
Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error if it 
is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or 
prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the 
jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the 
evidence. More specifically, prosecutorial misconduct during 
closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the 
comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent 
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial 
court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded. 
State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (citations, 
quotations, and brackets omitted). Where the argument complained of is made 
in rebuttal closing, the United States Supreme Court has recognized "[tlhe 
prosecutors' comments must be evaluated in light of the defense argument that 
preceded it." Darden v. Wainwriqht, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986). 
Although it is undoubtedly error for a prosecutor to vouch for the credibility 
of a witness, it is not error for a prosecutor to ask the jury to draw inferences 
regarding credibility from the evidence. State v. Porter, 130 ldaho 772, 786, 948 
P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Gross, 146 ldaho I S , ,  189 P.3d 477, 481 (Ct. 
App. 2008); State v. Timmons, 145 ldaho 279, 288-89, 178 P.3d 644, 653-54 (Ct. 
App. 2007). Wheeler argues the following portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal 
closing argument was improper: 
There's nothing wrong with Officer Jayne's investigation because 
there's some minor inconsistency between something that was said 
in three different places. Did you hear anything that struck you as 
being, the officer is lying? I mean, everything that the officer said 
has been corroborated by evidence that's been offered to you by 
the defense. So think about that. Is he going to risk his career to 
make this case? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.22 (quoting Tr., Vol. II, p.401, L.25 - p.402, L.8).) 
Wheeler does not explain why he believes this argument constitutes 
improper vouching other than to assert, "the prosecutor argued that the minor 
discrepancies in the officer's testimony should be ign~red."~ (Appellant's Brief, 
p.22.) It is clear from the face of the rebuttal argument excerpted above that the 
prosecutor did not ask the jury to "ignore" anything. The prosecutor merely 
asserted Trooper Jayne's investigation was not deficient merely because 
Wheeler thought there were some inconsistencies in what Trooper Jayne said. 
Such argument was a proper, measured response to Wheeler's claims in closing 
argument suggesting the state's witnesses were "liars," including Trooper Jayne. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. 11, p.383, L.2 - p.390, L. l l .)  Contrary to Wheeler's assertions, this 
is not improper vouching, it is merely asking the jury to reach a contrary 
conclusion on the officer's motivations and actions than that advocated by the 
defense. 
Indeed, Wheeler fails to cite, much less discuss, any Idaho case on the issue of 
vouching. (See generalb Appellant's Brief, pp.22-24.) He instead cites a Ninth 
Circuit case which states "improper vouching may occur in at least two ways" - 
"[tlhe prosecutor may either 'place the prestige of the government behind the 
witness or . . . indicate that information not presented to the jury supports the 
witness's testimony."' Appellant's Brief, p.24, quoting United States v. Edwards, 
\h . 154 F.3d 915, 921 (9 Clr. 1998)). However, Wheeler does not assert the 
prosecutor in this case vouched for Trooper Jayne in either of these two ways. 
The prosecutor in this case did exactly what prosecutors are allowed to 
do. He asked the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence 
regarding whether the officer fabricated evidence, as claimed by Wheeler. It is 
not "vouching" to address and rebut such defense claims, especially such serious 
allegations as having fabricated evidence, a felony in Idaho. See I.C. 3 18-2603 
(fabricating or altering evidence in felony case is felony punishable by up to five 
years in prison). Wheeler has thus failed to show error. 
Even if it was error for the prosecutor to suggest that Trooper Jayne would 
not "risk his career to make this case," see, e.a., Gross, supra, the error was not 
fundamental. The prosecutor's solitary comment implying that Trooper Jayne 
would not "risk his career" by lying about minor details was not the type of 
argument that is calculated to "inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or 
prejudice against" Wheeler, nor was it "so inflammatory that the jurors may [have] 
beten] influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence." Sheahan, 
139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969. Thus, even assuming Wheeler has raised a 
prosecutorial misconduct claim separate and distinct from his Napue claim, and 
even assuming the prosecutor's comment implying Trooper Jayne would not "risk 
his career to make this case," the error was not fundamental, and Wheeler has 
failed to establish any deprivation of due process. 
II. 
Wheeler Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Wheeler complains the district court erred in denying his suppression 
motion because, he argues, (1) "the forcible blood draw was unreasonable under 
the circumstances of this case," and (2) he "revoked his implied ~onsent."~ 
(Appellant's Brief, p.26.) Both of Wheeler's claims fail. The district court 
correctly concluded the blood draw was permissible under State v. Diaz, 144 
ldaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klinaler, 143 ldaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006); State v. Barker, 136 
ldaho 278, 280, 40 P.3d 86, 88 (2002); State v. Spencer, 139 ldaho 736, 738, 85 
Wheeler also argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because, he asserts, the prosecutor failed to correct Trooper Jayne's false 
testimony, which he claims the district court "reli[ed'In on when "making its 
decision to allow the results of the forcible blood test to be admitted." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.26.) Specifically, Wheeler argues the district court relied on 
Trooper Jayne's "lie[]" that he told Wheeler if he did not consent to a breath test, 
he was going to perform a blood draw. (Appellant's Brief, p.35.) Because 
whether Trooper Jayne lied about giving Wheeler the option is irrelevant to the 
issues presented at the suppression hearing, Wheeler's argument that the 
"district court erred in finding the actions of the police officer reasonable in light of 
the fact that he lied" (Appellant's Brief, p.35) lacks merit. 
P.3d 1135, 1137 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Devore, 134 ldaho 344, 346-47, 2 P.3d 
153, 155-56 (Ct. App. 2000). 
C. The District Court Correctlv Applied The Law To The Facts In Denvinq 
Wheeler's Motion To Suppress 
The district court, relying on the ldaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. 
Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007), denied Wheeler's suppression 
-
motion, concluding (1) Wheeler could not revoke his consent under I.C. $$ 18- 
8002, and (2) there was no unreasonable use of force in withdrawing his blood. 
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., pp.27-33.) Wheeler claims both of these conclusions were 
erroneous. Wheeler is incorrect. 
In &, the ldaho Supreme Court held, pursuant to Idaho's implied 
consent statute, law enforcement may require an individual suspected of driving 
under the influence to submit to "evidentiary testing for alcohol," which may 
"include testing the suspect's blood . . .." 144 ldaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741 
(citing I.C. § 18-8002(1), (9)). The Court in Diaz further stated "a blood draw 
must comport with Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness." & at 303, 
160 P.3d at 742. As in all Fourth Amendment contexts, "reasonableness 
standards are assessed objectively by examining the totality of the 
circumstances." Id. (citations omitted). Applying this standard to the 
circumstances in Diaz's case. the Court concluded the blood draw was 
reasonable, stating: 
Here, Diaz was first offered a breathalyzer test, which he initially 
refused, then agreed to, and ultimately refused. After Diaz had 
declined this somewhat less intrusive alternative, [Officer] 
Montgomery transported him to a nearby hospital where a qualified 
hospital technician drew his blood. Diaz was not manhandled while 
being transported to the hospital or during the procedure itself. 
Under the totality of the circumstances the police acted reasonably, 
using only handcuffs to transport Diaz to the hospital and having 
the blood test administered by a qualified hospital technician. 
m, 144 ldaho at 303,160 P.3d at 742. 
Implicit in the Court's opinion that the implied consent statute permits 
evidentiary testing to determine blood alcohol content is the conclusion that such 
consent cannot be withdrawn. Not only is this conclusion implicit in m, it is 
expressly articulated in State v. Cooper, 136 ldaho 697, 39 P.3d 637 (Ct. App. 
2002), citing State v. Woolery, 11 6 ldaho 368, 775 P.2d 121 0 (1 989). In Cooper, 
the Court of Appeals stated: 
Cooper argues that he revoked his previously implied 
consent when he refused to submit to a blood test and that the 
consequence of his refusal is suspension of his driver's license 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A. This issue was previously raised and 
rejected in Woolery, where our Supreme Court held that the ldaho 
Legislature has acknowledged a driver's physical ability to refuse to 
submit to an evidentiary test, but did not create a statutory right for 
a driver to withdraw his previously given consent to an evidentiary 
testing for alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances. 
136 ldaho at 700. 39 P.3d at 640, 
In discussing the issue of implied consent, Wheeler does not cite & or 
Cooper. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.32-34.) Rather, Wheeler, citing Woolery and 
State v. Turner, 94 ldaho 548, 494 P.2d 146 (1972), acknowledges the "ldaho 
Supreme Court has previously held that, 'there is no constitutional right to refuse' 
an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration," but suggests that holding is of no 
import because it "was not based on any federal court authority" and because "no 
federal court has every squarely addressed whether a suspect retains the right to 
revoke his implied consent to evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration, under 
the Fourth Amendment." (Appellant's Brief, p.33.) Wheeler's argument is both 
factually wrong and irrelevant. 
The ldaho Supreme Court's opinions in both Woolew and Turner relied on 
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757 (1966), in which the Supreme Court concluded that a forced blood draw 
taken from an individual suspected of driving under the influence did not violate 
his constitutional rights. 384 U.S. at 758-59. While the Supreme Court's opinion 
was predicated upon the exigency exception to the warrant requirement rather 
than an implied consent statute, for Fourth Amendment purposes that distinction 
is irrelevant. 
Also irrelevant is whether the Court's conclusions in Woolery and Turner 
were "based on any federal court authority." Such reliance is not a prerequisite 
to whether ldaho precedent is binding in ldaho or whether a party is required to 
cite such precedent. Idaho's appellate courts have clearly concluded that implied 
consent cannot be revoked. The rule of stare decisis dictates that controlling 
precedent be followed "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over 
time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 
ldaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); State v. Humphrevs, 134 ldaho 657, 660, 8 
P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houahland Farms. Inc. v. Johnson, I19  ldaho 72, 
77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)); see also State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 981, 1001, 
842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) ("[Pjrior decisions of this Court should govern unless 
they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); 
State v. Odiaaa, 125 Idaho 384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having 
previously decided this question, and being presented with no new basis upon 
which to consider the issue, [the court must be] guided by the principle of stare 
decisis to adhere to the law as expressed in [its] earlier opinions.") 
Wheeler has also failed to establish the district court erroneously 
concluded the blood draw was not unreasonable. In reaching this conclusion, 
the district court found: 
[A]s in the Diaz case there is evidence before the court that the 
person that drew the blood appears to be a medical technician 
qualified to do that. I agree with the state that the issue here is not 
whether in fact that personnel from Clark Fork ambulance is in fact 
an R.N. or is a phlebotomist or is otherwise qualified to draw blood 
does not bear on the reasonableness of the police conduct. It 
could bear on the admissibility of the results of that blood sample, 
but it does not bear on the reasonableness of the police conduct. 
It was reasonable in the court's view for the trooper to rely 
on the ambulance member's assertion that he was qualified to draw 
blood. That seems like a reasonable course of conduct is to rely on 
that assertion. 
And then the fact that this blood draw was done at the scene 
of the arrest rather than at a hospital is a little bit different from the 
Diaz case. And in fact in this case Mr. Wheeler was not even 
placed in the ambulance, he was in the back seat of a patrol car. 
But there is no evidence before the court that it is a medially 
unacceptable manner of withdrawing blood. This court in its 
common sense and life experience presumes that there are other 
times in life where emergency medical responders draw blood in 
scenes other than a hospital or other than a [sic] ambulance that 
probably draw blood or administer injections, administer medical 
procedures while persons are sitting not even in police patrol cars, 
but in other privately owned vehicles as well. So there's no 
evidence before the court that this is a medically unacceptable 
manner of withdrawing the blood. 
Now, the evidence before the court also is that one officer 
held Mr. Wheeler's left arm and that Trooper Jayne held, by the 
wrist of Mr. Wheeler, Mr. Wheeler's right arm and held that right 
arm out in a more or less straight manner, maybe not at a 90 
degree angle from the ground, but at least held the arm out so that 
the elbow was extended such that the person drawing the blood 
could actually do that procedure and draw the blood. But there's no 
evidence before this court that that is an unreasonable use of force. 
It would be dangerous to Mr. Wheeler given the fact that he 
had been physically uncooperative to a small degree, but to a 
degree, physically uncooperative with the police, they had to 
restrain him from sitting down when they're trying to conduct field 
sobriety examinations, it would be dangerous to Mr. Wheeler to 
allow him to even begin moving his arm or thrashing, it would be 
injurious [sic] to him to allow that. It would injurious [sic] to the 
possible procedure of taking the blood to allow that. 
So for one officer to hold the left wrist of Mr. Wheeler and 
another officer to extend the right arm by holding the right wrist of 
Mr. Wheeler, this court is going to find is not an unreasonable use 
of force but is in fact a reasonable use. I would not even call it a 
force, a reasonable use of physical touching of the suspect or a 
physical control of a suspect. 
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.31, L.21 - p.33, L.24.) 
On appeal, Wheeler, relying on his own embellished version of events, 
contends "Trooper Jayne's conduct was unreasonable." (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.31-32.) In support of his claim, Wheeler notes (1) his belief that Trooper 
Jayne's request for a breath test was "superficial," (2) Trooper Jayne "obtained 
hobbles out of the trunk of his car in anticipation of Mr. Wheeler physically 
refusing the blood draw," (3) Wheeler told them not to draw his blood, said it hurt, 
and said he was "leaking blood all over the place," and (4) he "informed Trooper 
Jayne that he was hurting his leg restraining him during the blood draw." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.31-32.) None of these arguments establish unreasonable 
force was used in drawing Wheeler's blood. 
First, Wheeler's belief that Trooper Jayne's request for a breath test was 
"superficial" is irrelevant. "The evidentiary test to be employed is of the officer's 
choosing." Qiaz, 144 ldaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741 (citing Halen v. State, 136 
ldaho 829, 833, 41 P.3d 257, 302 (2002)). Trooper Jayne was, therefore, not 
obligated to provide Wheeler the opportunity, superficial or otherwise, to submit 
to a breath test before conducting a blood draw. And, there is no constitutional 
basis for "[sjuppressing the blood test results in this case" to "encourage officers 
to use forcible blood draws when necessary and not simply as a matter of 
course." (Appellant's Brief, p.30.) 
Second, the fact that Trooper Jayne retrieved hobbles from his trunk in 
case Wheeler became uncooperative is also irrelevant. There is no such thing 
as an anticipatory Fourth Amendment violation. Trooper Jayne never hobbled 
Wheeler in order to obtain his blood. Neither the presence of unused hobbles 
nor Trooper Jayne's opinion that Wheeler might be combative renders the blood 
draw unreasonable. 
Third, as previously noted, because Wheeler impliedly consented to 
evidentiary testing, including a blood draw, the fact that he did not want his blood 
drawn is immaterial. 
Fourth, that Wheeler stated it hurt when he was actually poked with the 
needle does not mean the force used was unreasonable. If that were true, all 
blood draws would be unreasonable. 
Fifth, Wheeler's drunken statement on the video that he was "leaking 
blood all over" not only does not make it so, it does not mean the force was 
unreasonable. 
Sixth, Wheeler did not complain about Trooper Jayne "restraining" his leg 
until after the blood draw. (Ex. 1, compare 19:03:20 (Trooper Jayne asks EMT 
for band-aid) & 19:03:30 (Trooper Jayne tells Wheeler they are done "poking 
him") 19:04:08 (Wheeler complains Trooper Jayne is "breaking his leg").) 
How Wheeler's complaint affer the blood draw that Trooper Jayne was hurting 
- - 
his leg demonstrates there was unreasonable force used in obtaining his blood is 
unclear. 
In short, a review of the video of the blood draw supports the district 
court's conclusion that the blood draw was reasonable. (See generallv Ex. 1, 
18:53:50-19:03:30.) Wheeler has failed to establish otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Wheeler's conviction 
and sentence in Docket No. 35684 and the sentence imposed in Docket No. 
35677. 
DATED this gth day of July 2009. 
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